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Abstract
The fi scal governance of the EMU is in dire need of reform. Its current 
arrangements suﬀ er from several shortcomings, most notably, the limitations 
they impose on national fi scal policies, steering them towards too restrictive 
or pro-cyclical stances; the absence of an unconditional lender of last resort 
for governments and the consequent doubts over the ‘safe asset’ status of 
national government bonds that this absence creates; the underdevelopment 
of an economic (policy) union, resulting in the dominance of public defi cit 
and debt considerations over considerations of well-being, full employment 
and broader economic objectives in guiding the conduct of fi scal policies; and 
last but not least, the fact that, under the EMU institutional architecture, 
there are fewer opportunities for democratic participation and scrutiny of the 
conduct of fi scal policies. Starting from the view that the crises in the euro 
zone were basically triggered by fi nancial markets and reinforced by a lack 
of instruments for eﬀ ective economic policy at the EMU level, we contribute 
to the ongoing debate on how to reform the Eurozone. We propose a focus on 
general principles for fi scal governance reform aiming at a better economic, 
social and environmental performance on the part of EMU. As the main 
principles for progressive governance, we identify a need for: 
– a much more active and prominent role for fi scal policy; 
– ‘safer’ government bonds; 
– more and better coordination between fi scal and other economic, social 
and environmental policies, as well as between member states, to foster 
sustainable well-being; and 
– more democratic participation and scrutiny. 
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1. Introduction
The fi scal governance of the euro zone is in dire need of reform. Spurred by the 
crisis and its economic, social and political impact, the debate on the adequacy 
of the institutional architecture of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
has regained momentum in recent years. This includes high policy-level 
documents, ranging from the Van Rompuy and the Five Presidents reports in 
2012 and 2015, respectively, to the European Commission’s Refl ection Paper 
on Deepening the EMU in 2017. Steps have been taken to establish a Banking 
Union, although crucial elements are still lacking. To direct reforms more 
closely in line with the vision outlined in these documents, the European 
Commission set out a roadmap, including some legislative proposals, in 
December 2017, along with some concrete proposals for a euro-zone budget 
as part of the next EU Multi-annual Financial Framework in May 2018. 
By mid-December 2019, the European Council had only agreed on a number 
of minor steps to change EMU’s fi scal governance. The Commission proposal 
to establish an embryonic euro-zone budget within the EU Budget for 
stabilisation to asymmetric shocks has in the meantime degenerated into 
an agreement to establish a budgetary instrument for convergence and 
competitiveness (also known as ‘BICC’), lacking any features of a stabilisation 
mechanism. The most likely further step seems to be a ‘Capital Market 
Union’, potentially with negative side eﬀ ects (Gabor and Vestergaard 2018). 
Some announcements by the new Commission’s president, such as a ‘more 
growth-friendly fi scal stance in the euro area’, a Green Deal or a focus on the 
Sustainable Development Goals within the European Semester (von der Leyen 
2019) go in the right direction. What is missing is a more ambitious debate 
about EMU fi scal governance. This paper puts forward a set of progressive 
reforms of EMU fi scal governance, based on two points of departure: fi rst, 
our view that inappropriate fi scal policy and accelerated divergence within 
the euro area have been the main drivers of the poor economic and social 
performance observed since 2010; second, we recently witnessed a shift in 
the academic economics debate, with a focus on too restrictive fi scal policy (at 
least when monetary policy is limited by the zero lower bound; see Blanchard 
2019) and too low public investment (especially in Germany; see Bardt et al. 
2019) rather than public debt. Given the above, we believe that further changes 
of fi scal governance should be at the top of the new Commission’s agenda and 
we argue what these should be. 
We suggest that reform should take a progressive path, bringing on board 
social actors and political players at the national and European levels. In this 
paper, we focus on general principles for fi scal governance reform aiming at a 
better economic, social and environmental performance in EMU. As the main 
principles for progressive governance, we identify a need for: 
– a much more active and prominent role for fi scal policy; 
– ‘safer’ government bonds; 
– more and better coordination between fi scal and other economic, social 
and environmental policies, as well as between member states, to foster 
sustainable well-being; and 
– more democratic participation and scrutiny.
Álvarez et al. 
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2. Shortcomings of the current ﬁ scal 
governance arrangements
The current fi scal governance arrangements suﬀ er from various shortcom-
ings, the most important of which are: the limitations they impose on national 
fi scal policies, with rules which often steer them towards too restrictive and 
pro-cyclical stances; the absence of an unconditional lender of last resort for 
governments and the consequent doubts over the ‘safe asset’ status of na-
tional government bonds that this absence creates; the underdevelopment of 
an economic (policy) union, resulting in the dominance of public defi cit and 
debt considerations over considerations of well-being, full employment and 
broader economic objectives in guiding the conduct of fi scal policies; and last 
but not least, the fact that, under the EMU institutional architecture, there are 
fewer opportunities for democratic participation and scrutiny of the conduct 
of fi scal policies. In this section, we highlight these shortcomings in some de-
tail, as they are the point of departure for our reform proposals.
In principle, fi scal policy – understood as the management of taxation and 
public expenditure – can serve various objectives in a market economy. It can 
promote social cohesion, macroeconomic and fi nancial stability and aﬀ ect 
the growth prospects of the economy through several functions, including the 
provision of public goods and services, short-run stabilisation after a shock 
(for example, helping the economy return to high employment levels after a 
fall in aggregate demand), industrial policy and the redistribution of income. 
Governments cover expenditure for some of these functions by issuing debt 
in the form of government bonds. Government bonds play, additionally, an 
important role for the stability of the banking system, as they are normally 
considered to be ‘safe’ assets which banks keep in their balance sheets and use 
as collateral for borrowing. In nation states that issue their own currency, the 
‘safe’ asset status of government bonds is underpinned by the national central 
bank acting as a lender of last resort for the government: the national central 
bank implicitly guarantees that there will always be a buyer for government 
bonds and this is usually suﬃ  cient for keeping the interest rates of govern-
ment bonds relatively low. Last but not least, national governments are scru-
tinised for their conduct of fi scal policy by the national parliament, but also 
by the electorate. 
The launch of the single currency and the underlying philosophy of its insti-
tutional architecture changed fi scal governance. Although fi scal policies re-
mained mainly in the hands of national governments, rules for the conduct of 
Álvarez et al. 
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national fi scal policies, known as the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), were 
put into place: they did not address ‘what matters for the country as a whole 
going forward[,which] is the nation’s balance sheet’ (Stiglitz et al. 2018: 48), 
but set an upper limit for public defi cits of 3 per cent of GDP and for public 
debts of 60 per cent of GDP, later extended by a limit of just 0.5 per cent of 
potential GDP for structural defi cits. A ‘no bail-out’ clause was also adopted 
in the Treaty. The assumption underlying these rules was that only ‘sound’ 
fi scal policies, operationalised by the limits of the rules, could guarantee low 
market interest rates for government borrowing and therefore prevent nega-
tive spillovers across member states. These rules were further tightened after 
2011, most notably by making operational the public debt limit, with the adop-
tion of the six-pack, the two-pack and the Treaty on Stability, Coordination 
and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (the so-called ‘Fiscal 
Compact’). In 2015, the European Commission attempted to introduce some 
fl exibility in implementing these rules.
In their current form, these rules have become too complex (Pisani-Ferry 
2018), so their interpretation is in itself a discretionary – and very opaque – 
decision. An illustrative example is the case of Italy, with which the Commis-
sion reopened an Excessive Defi cit Procedure in autumn 2018, based on the 
already completed evaluation of the budgetary outcome of the former govern-
ment in 2017 to address the new government’s expansionary budgetary plan 
for 2019, with letters, negotiations and threats, but ultimately no further steps 
towards serious consequences. But more important, fi scal rules have several 
adverse consequences: 
First of all, the unnecessarily restrictive target values impede full utilisation of 
fi scal policy’s potential for sustainable well-being. At least assuming that the 
public value of wealth and goods can be higher than that achieved by highly 
concentrated private wealth, and that it is worth spending money on objec-
tives such as full employment and sustainability. However, EMU economic 
and fi scal governance seems to be guided by the idea that private solutions 
always maximise well-being, so national fi scal policies were to be restrained, 
while prioritising supply-side, liberalising structural reforms that emphasise 
market deregulation and competitiveness policies (intrinsically uncoopera-
tive policies). Intrinsically cooperative active demand-management policies, 
aimed at full employment, ceased to be a priority objective for economic poli-
cies (Rothschild 2009). Powerful ‘watchdog’ institutions rating parliamentary 
decisions such as fi scal boards or the proposed competitiveness boards (which 
in the end were recast as the less biased and voluntary national productiv-
ity boards) are intended to guarantee these political priorities. A clear break 
from this strategy is a prerequisite for improving the economic framework in 
Europe.
Second, they have proven to lead to pro-cyclical policies either by construc-
tion or through the inherent fl aws of almost any calculation method based 
on cyclical adjustment (for example, Heimberger 2019). These shortcomings, 
while already identifi ed and debated prior to the crisis, came into stark relief 
during the Great Recession years, when most member states were subjected to 
Towards a progressive EMU ﬁ scal governance 
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the ‘corrective arm’ of the SGP. The coordinated fi scal consolidation that fol-
lowed from implementing the fi scal rules resulted in an excessively restrictive 
aggregate fi scal stance in the area. Moreover, member states in which annual 
output contracted by 2 per cent or more were exempted from pursuing fi scal 
consolidation for the year in which they experienced that level of recession, 
but had to start reducing their budget defi cits as soon as output was no longer 
contracting so much, even if their output was not growing. The combination 
of these aggregate and individual member-state policy stances resulted in 
pro-cyclical eﬀ ects, which were counterproductive for improving the sustain-
ability of public fi nances across Europe. The more fl exible implementation of 
the rules introduced in 2015 and the stronger focus on an expenditure rule 
since 2017 have not been suﬃ  cient as they only apply to those countries whose 
defi cit is already under the 3 per cent limit and – as proven recently by Italy – 
comply with the potentially more restrictive debt rule. 
The current rules make member state governments responsible for the evolu-
tion of economic variables that are not in fact under their control. They also 
disregard the crucial role of public assets, including investment in infrastruc-
ture and human capital, for stimulating productivity growth, employment 
creation and well-being. In addition, they neglect the crucial role of discre-
tionary fi scal policy in stabilising member countries’ economies, especially in 
the absence of national monetary and exchange rate policies. These rules go 
against the principles of the ‘functional fi nance’ approach, formulated by Abba 
Lerner (1943), according to which economic policy should permit fi scal policy 
to support aggregate demand. So, when an economy suﬀ ers a negative shock 
and GDP decreases, fi scal policy should step in to compensate. With strict fi s-
cal rules, however, the goal of full employment must be neglected, along with 
other detrimental – in terms of well-being – economic and social results. This 
is the case within the euro zone, where the ‘rules contributed to excessive fi scal 
austerity during the crisis’ (Darvas et al. 2018: 1). Finally, they have become 
increasingly complex and opaque. The targets included in the rules have been 
controversial, with no evidence that they are optimal for allowing enough 
space for fi scal policies to achieve their purposes (see, for example, Buiter and 
Grafe 2004) or that they can be sustainable in the long run. 
Thus, one of the main characteristics of the current euro-zone economic policy 
framework is that the scope for adequate utilisation of fi scal policy has been 
strongly constrained at the national level, even though countries need to run 
more active fi scal policies because they have lost control over their interest 
rates and exchange rates. These constraints have been even more binding in 
the absence of a signifi cant fi scal capacity at the European level. 
Thirdly, the launch of the euro meant that individual member states lost their 
lender of last resort, as the ECB was the central bank of the euro area as a 
whole. Member states and the interest rates at which they could borrow be-
came more vulnerable to fi nancial market perceptions about the sustainabil-
ity of their public debt and the ‘safety’ of their government bonds. Although, 
as experience has shown, fi nancial market perceptions are often not rational, 
they can pose severe constraints and unnecessary limitations on the fi scal 
Álvarez et al. 
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space for primary expenditure of member states in distress. During the crisis, 
there was thus a divergence between the security of government bonds and 
their interest rates among member states.
A single currency, in principle, is not compatible with disparate national inter-
est rates as this makes the transmission of monetary policy diﬃ  cult. Although 
the ECB’s quantitative easing policy has spurred interest rate convergence 
again and brought them down in practice, a durable solution would require 
that public debts, like bank deposits, become safe assets again. Nevertheless, 
several countries reject the most eﬀ ective way of avoiding such disparities, 
which is an unlimited guarantee to counterparties. In particular, the German 
Constitutional Court forbids any guarantee not explicitly agreed by the Ger-
man Parliament. A reliable unlimited guarantee is a prerequisite for the single 
currency, however.
Fourthly, the decision-making process for fi scal policy has shifted. De jure, 
fi scal and more generally economic policy in EMU is decided by the European 
Council. De facto, however, the Eurogroup is decisive. It is an informal meet-
ing of national representatives with rather weak legitimacy to decide on Eu-
ropean issues, with no formally binding obligation to make decisions and dis-
cussions public, and no possibility to hold single participants accountable. In 
a recent report on the workings of the Eurogroup, Transparency International 
EU concluded: ‘even while operating as a de-facto gouvernement économ-
ique, the Eurogroup as such is not accountable to anyone’ (Braun and Hüb-
ner 2019). The Eurogroup Working Group (EWG) prepares the decisions. The 
EWG consists of senior oﬃ  cials from national administrations of euro area 
member states, the Commission and the European Central Bank. Its work 
is entirely opaque; the only information available on its website concerns its 
President. Neither the current agenda nor decisions are available, and there is 
no parliamentary involvement. 
In such an institutional arrangement, there is no possibility for European citi-
zens to infl uence the outcomes or at least to vote for other representatives to 
shape the future at European level. The problem is especially pressing in cases 
such as Troika programmes, where the ESM board – which eﬀ ectively consists 
of the members of the Eurogroup – can use their greater bargaining power to 
force a democratically much more strongly legitimised national government 
to accept nearly every condition they impose, regardless of whether it is in 
line with European legislation or not (see Fischer-Lescano 2014). Although 
the Eurogroup members themselves have the same national legitimacy, these 
processes usually hardly allow for decisions to be contested in detail by their 
national parliaments.
Towards a progressive EMU ﬁ scal governance 
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3.  A critical review of current reform 
proposals
The shortcomings of EMU fi scal governance that the crisis laid bare triggered 
a still ongoing debate and several reforms and proposals. Views on lessons 
learned varied. One of the key diﬀ erences underlying the diﬀ erent views on 
the causes of the crisis and the way forward concerns the role of the state 
and of fi nancial markets. At one end of the spectrum, the crises in the euro 
zone were basically triggered by fi nancial markets and reinforced by a lack of 
instruments for eﬀ ective economic policy at the EMU level. At the other end 
of the spectrum, the roots of the crises lay with uncontrolled discretionary 
expansive fi scal policy and other forms of ‘irresponsible’ national economic 
policy interventions. The six-pack, two-pack and Fiscal Compact reforms were 
clearly informed by views about ‘irresponsible’ fi scal policies. 
Beyond these, the European Commission put the main legislative proposals 
for fi scal governance reform on the table in December 2017 (European Com-
mission 2017a) following the ‘Five Presidents’ Report’ (Juncker et al. 2015) 
and the European Commission’s Refl ection Papers on Deepening the EMU 
and the Future of Europe (European Commission 2017b and 2017c). These 
were followed by suggestions made by economists (Bénassy-Quéré et al. 2018, 
Andor et al. 2018, Darvas et al. 2018), trade unions (DGB 2018 and ETUC 
2018) and governments (especially the Meseberg declaration, see Bundesr-
egierung 2018), most of them from Germany and France, two economies ac-
counting for half the euro zone’s GDP. The European Commission also tabled 
a proposal for establishing an embryonic euro-zone fi scal capacity for stabilis-
ing investment against asymmetric shocks within the next Multi-annual Fi-
nancial Framework (that is, the EU Budget) for 2021–27 in May 2018. These 
proposals sought to address some of the shortcomings of fi scal governance 
identifi ed in the previous section.
Oﬃ  cial proposals acknowledged the need for a stronger role for fi scal policy 
and a more eﬀ ective counter-cyclical design, focused on the establishment of a 
fi scal capacity or a euro-zone budget. If they were implemented sensibly, such 
reforms would support national fi scal policies, increase the counter-cyclicality 
of fi scal policy at both the national and the euro-area level and strengthen 
public investment. Such proposals also carry risks, however, insofar as they 
are usually linked to further restrictions on national fi scal policies as a precon-
dition of their implementation. Even if a progressively interpreted fi scal ca-
pacity were successfully developed at the euro-zone level, the EU current fi scal 
rules would still need fundamental reform because they focus on arbitrary tar-
Álvarez et al. 
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get values for the headline defi cit and the debt-to-GDP level. Some economists 
(for example, EFB 2019) have also been suggesting further reinforcement of 
the existing fi scal rules by allowing the Commission to deprive non-compliant 
member states of access to structural funds and of their voting rights at the 
Council. It is not evident, however, that rules ought to be strengthened given 
the lack of economic justifi cation. 
Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2018) claimed to have put forward a pragmatic com-
promise between risk sharing – through better policy coordination and the 
pooling of common resources – and risk mitigation (through tougher rules 
and more market discipline). It is unlikely, however, that further reforms will 
go beyond a minimal consensus and move the EMU forward. The expected 
result of this is to end up with the status quo, characterised by ‘an ineﬀ ective 
combination of complex rules, erratic market discipline and loose inter-gov-
ernmental cooperation arrangements’ (Andor et al. 2018). 
One of the most dangerous reform ideas is to increase the ability of fi nancial 
market actors to control member states, for example by treating government 
bonds as risky assets in banks’ balance sheets (Andritzky et al. 2016). The pos-
sibility of a member state defaulting on its public debt or exiting from the 
euro zone would be thus explicitly introduced. This of course would further 
weaken member states’ public fi nances and encourage speculation, posing the 
question of whether and if so, how desirable it is that fi nancial market actors 
should be in charge of evaluating national fi scal policies.
Another problematic idea for fi scal governance reform concerns the introduc-
tion of a euro-area ministry of economy and fi nance (European Commission 
2017b), which would have the power to oblige member states to modify their 
budget plans. Although it might improve coordination, within the current 
framework of fi scal policymaking, based as it is on restrictive numerical tar-
gets and contested structural reform proposals, it is more likely that it would 
demand inadequate economic policies for each member state analysed in iso-
lation instead of coordinating them to maximise material well-being and full 
employment. Furthermore, without a broader change in the governance struc-
ture, the power to shape economic policy will remain within the ECOFIN/
Eurogroup. In the current setup, transferring more power to European in-
stitutions could be dangerous, as it might weaken democratic participation 
possibilities and restrict national policies even further without compensation 
in the form of tools to enhance economic and social performance at the Euro-
pean level. 
More democratic participation and control is addressed in the Five Presidents’ 
Report (Juncker et al. 2015: 17): ‘Greater responsibility and integration at EU 
and euro area level should go hand in hand with greater democratic account-
ability, legitimacy and institutional strengthening. This is both a condition for 
success and a natural consequence of the increasing interdependence within 
EMU.’ The report, however, fails to address the central question of democ-
racy, namely how citizens can shape decisions. In representative democracies, 
politicians representing a majority can take decisions. If they fail to address 
Towards a progressive EMU ﬁ scal governance 
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the changes requested by majorities, they can be voted out of oﬃ  ce. At the 
European level, such a mechanism is missing for economic policy-making. 
The problem, as stated by Begg (2018: 30), is to ‘reconcile the desire for col-
lective discipline, portrayed as being in the common interest, with national 
autonomy and democratic choice’. Although it is not clear whether there is a 
good answer, it is obvious that the current reform proposals would not change 
much. The Five Presidents’ Report itself contains only proposals to strengthen 
the dialogue between institutions, for example between the Council and the 
Parliament, inter-parliamentary meetings and visits to national parliaments. 
Without further involvement in the decision-making process, however, dia-
logues tend to amount to little more than listening to the statements of the 
other party, but not taking into account their interests and concerns in de-
cision-making. The fact that the new Commission’s president recognises the 
‘need to move towards full co-decision power for the European Parliament’ 
(von der Leyen 2019: 20), is at least a promising announcement.
At the time of writing, the timely completion of the Banking Union seems to 
have stalled, whereas the European Commission’s proposal for a euro-zone 
stabilisation mechanism (a fi scal capacity) have been reduced to a Budgetary 
Instrument for Convergence and Competitiveness, which is far smaller than 
necessary to the point of being largely symbolic, without any stabilisation fea-
tures (Eurogroup 2019). This will probably not be enough for the euro area to 
survive a new economic crisis or to create suﬃ  cient political support to resist 
populist political attacks arising from the lack of economic and social progress 
linked to the European integration project.
Álvarez et al. 
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4. A progressive way forward 
4.1 Principle 1: a much more active and prominent role 
for ﬁ scal policy
As national fi scal policies are quantitatively still much more important than 
European ones, a principal objective of reform is to enable them to perform 
their role. A European fi scal capacity to fi nance public investment and more 
generally European common goods (such as fi ghting climate change), fi nanced 
by common resources (such as a carbon tax and a fi nancial transaction tax), 
and by issuing euro-bonds, can be supportive – as long as it is not linked to 
additional constraints on national public budgets. 
One fundamental and economically justifi ed reform would be to replace the 
SGP altogether. Policymakers should replace it with a comprehensive ap-
proach to macroeconomic policy coordination involving monetary policy, 
fi scal policy as well as macroprudential, income and exchange rate policies 
where applicable, at both the national and the EMU-wide level (see Principle 
3, as well as Mathieu and Sterdyniak 2013; Hein and Truger 2017). In this 
case, member states would be disciplined only if their policies are detrimental 
to their partners. Such an approach is politically highly ambitious and there-
fore diﬃ  cult to implement in the short run. 
The scope for a much more active and prominent role for fi scal policy is three-
fold: (i) there should be more leeway to strengthen economic and social sta-
bilisation, especially in times of crisis; (ii) public investment should be given 
preference; and (iii) structural policies should be implemented to tackle coun-
try-specifi c shocks.
4.1.1 More leeway to strengthen economic and social 
stabilisation
As the ambitious approach of replacing the SDP is not likely to be adopted in 
the short term, but more leeway is nevertheless needed, in this section we pro-
pose less ambitious fi scal policy reforms, drawing on proposals from Truger 
(2015b) and in the iAGS 2017 (Timbeau et al. 2016) to use the interpretational 
leeway of the current framework. None of these options is a suﬃ  cient solution 
on its own or a game changer, but all of them are potentially available and 
could help to increase to fi scal leeway. 
Towards a progressive EMU ﬁ scal governance 
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To improve cyclical stabilisation ex ante – that is, before a crisis or excessive 
capacity utilisation is under way – the EU Commission’s method of cyclical 
adjustment must be reconsidered. This would help to stabilise potential out-
put estimates, thus enabling automatic stabilisers to work fully when the fi s-
cal rules are applied (Mathieu and Sterdyniak 2015; Truger 2015b). Methods 
to achieve that (point [1] in Table 1) could include averaging several potential 
output estimates or calculating potential output in such a way that the de-
crease of investment during a recession does not have an impact on it, for 
example by calculating the equilibrium unemployment rate so that increases 
in the actual unemployment rate do not aﬀ ect it in the short run. Consider-
ing the recent debate about ‘nonsense output gaps’ (Brooks and Basile 2019; 
Heimberger 2019; Tooze 2019), we should add that in general, the estimated 
output gap should not be seen as a reliable parameter for policy recommenda-
tions. The alternative of once again prioritising rules based on nominal gross 
debt or the headline defi cit (for example, ‘black zero’ in Germany) is worse, 
however, so in a second-best world of too strict fi scal rules it is still better to 
use potential output estimates in favour of a more anticyclical fi scal policy.
In addition, by using adequate fi scal multipliers in the budgetary analysis ex 
ante (point [2]) we can help to develop a better estimate of the real budget-
ary eﬀ ect of fi scal measures – doing so will help prevent growth-reducing 
expenditure cuts during slowdowns. 
If an economy is already in recession, reference to adverse cyclical conditions 
might help to increase leeway even further (point [3]), although this could 
create the danger of a stop/go policy if cyclical conditions improve, as can be 
expected under a stimulus programme. Probably the most convincing way 
to increase member states’ fi scal space in the short run would be to use the 
provision concerning a severe downturn in the euro area or the EU as a whole 
(point [4]) to justify an expansionary fi scal policy, thus allowing for a substan-
tial European Investment Programme. The Commission has explicitly made 
a comparison with the 2008 European Economic Recovery Plan (European 
Commission 2008) to give an example of the potential use of this provision 
(European Commission 2015: 17). As a condition for use it ‘should remain lim-
Goal Measures
Cyclical stabilisation 
(ex ante)
(1) implement better methods of cyclical adjustment
(2) use a realistic ﬁ scal multiplier in budgetary analysis ex ante, especially for public 
investment
Cyclical stabilisation 
(ex post in crisis)
(3) increase ﬂ exibility for cyclical conditions
(4) use exceptional powers for severe (EU-wide) downturn
(5) use balanced-budget-multiplier 
(6) create a euro area stabilisation instrument
Strengthening public 
investment
(7) allow for temporary investment programmes (similar to EFSI) 
(8) interpret certain temporary investment programmes as ‘structural reforms’
Source: Authors’ table based on Truger (2015b).
Table 1 Short-term options for more ﬁ scal leeway in the EMU 
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ited to exceptional, carefully circumscribed situations to minimise the risk of 
moral hazard’ (European Commission 2015: 17). 
Finally, at the national level (point [5]), if fi scal leeway is exhausted, a (par-
tially) tax fi nanced expenditure stimulus may kick-start the economy by ex-
ploiting the balanced-budget multiplier (Haavelmo 1945). However, another 
idea is to activate a euro area stabilisation instrument (point [6]) in such a 
case (see Buti and Carnot 2018). This could provide additional fi nancial re-
sources to a member state that has experienced a particularly severe shock 
but should probably only be for certain expenditure categories, such as invest-
ment or for spending related to unemployment. 
Regarding strengthening public investment, additional net investment could 
be justifi ed if it came in the form of a temporary investment programme, sim-
ilar to the way the Commission interprets contributions to the EFSI (point 
[7]). The current exception for ‘structural reforms’ lacks a clear defi nition and 
the assumption that they always raise potential output and therefore public 
revenue in the long run is problematic. It may be possible, however, to treat 
an investment programme as a structural reform that temporarily allows for 
additional leeway of up to 0.5 per cent of GDP (point (8)). The conditionalities 
and limits set by the Commission and the Council in their current interpre-
tation – co-fi nancing of EU projects, limit of 0.5 per cent of GDP, mostly for 
countries in the preventive arm – certainly prevents a substantial and sus-
tained fi scal stimulus. Even so, at least the provisions may be used for some 
stimulus, and political pressure may be built up to push for a more generous 
interpretation in application or for a more generous oﬃ  cial reinterpretation.
If the next cyclical downturn or even crisis comes before the more compre-
hensive fi scal reform proposals advocated in this paper have been implement-
ed, it will be crucial for prosperity and the survival of the euro that pragmatic 
steps like those presented in Table 1 are taken. 
4.1.2 Safeguard public investment
As a pragmatic way to deal with public investment quite compatible with the 
current SGP framework, we propose a Golden Rule for public investment (see, 
for example, Truger 2015a) combined with a specifi c type of spending rule ap-
proach (see Principle 2 for our more ambitious proposal). The proposal aims 
at implementing the traditional public fi nance concept of the golden rule with-
in the framework of the SGP, that is, excluding net public investment from 
both the calculation of the headline and the structural defi cit, so that net pub-
lic investment can be fi nanced via defi cits. Formulated as an expenditure rule, 
it allows us to abandon the concept of structural defi cit within the SGP. The 
limits for nominal expenditure growth should be determined by the medium-
term growth rate of real potential output plus the ECB target infl ation rate of 2 
per cent. Increases in permanent nominal expenditure growth above this limit 
– which will be necessary to tackle social and ecological challenges – are then 
allowed if revenues are increased simultaneously. In case of general tax cuts 
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– which are not recommended – however, expenditure growth rates should 
incorporate these withdrawals of resources, with a likely overall detrimental 
eﬀ ect on well-being. Using medium-term potential growth rates and the target 
infl ation rate stabilises expenditure growth over the cycle. In any case, public 
investment should be favoured by separating current and investment budgets, 
just as in the golden rule proposal. 
Privileging public investment makes sense from an economic point of view. 
The true golden rule strives for an intertemporal realisation of the pay-as-you-
use principle in the case that present government spending provides future 
benefi ts. It allows fi nancing of such spending (net public investment) by gov-
ernment defi cits thus promoting intergenerational equity. Net public invest-
ment increases the public and/or social capital stock and provides benefi ts for 
future generations. Therefore, it is justifi ed that future generations contribute 
to fi nancing those investments via debt servicing. Future generations inherit 
the burden of public debt, but in exchange, they receive a corresponding pub-
lic and/or social capital stock. Failure to allow for debt fi nancing of future 
generations’ benefi ts will lead to a disproportionate burden for the present 
generation through higher taxes or lower spending, creating incentives for the 
under-provision of public investment to the detriment of future generations. 
Germany is an example of a country with strong fi scal rules and also underin-
vestment. This general incentive problem is exacerbated in times of fi scal con-
solidation when cutting public investment may seem politically expedient as 
the easiest way of reducing the budget defi cit. Recent experience with ‘auster-
ity’ policies shows that this danger is real. The German case and developments 
in countries such as Spain raise awareness about investment and appropriate 
fi scal rules (for example, EFB 2019).
The natural starting point for the analysis is the debate about the growth ef-
fects of public investment, as classifi ed in the national accounts, as it has re-
ceived the most attention in the literature. Bom and Ligthart (2014) conduct-
ed meta-regressions for the public capital–growth nexus. According to their 
results, the implied marginal returns are in the range between 10 per cent 
(short run, national, all public capital) to 34.6 per cent (long run, regional, 
core infrastructure). One may safely assume that traditional public invest-
ment has markedly positive growth eﬀ ects. 
In addition to the longer-run supply-side eﬀ ects, we must address the short-
run demand-side eﬀ ects of public investment. As to the question of the rela-
tive size of the public investment multiplier, the pre-crisis literature as a rule 
of thumb found it to be (slightly) above 1 and therefore slightly larger than for 
other spending categories. The implication is that public investment, in addi-
tion to its long-term economic advantages, could be seen as the most eﬀ ective 
short-run fi scal policy instrument (see, for example, Gechert and Rannenberg 
2014). 
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4.1.3 Foster reforms of regional economic structures
Fiscal policy is not only a short-run stabilisation tool; in fact, when aimed 
at maintaining suﬃ  cient levels of demand in the economy, it has stable and 
lasting eﬀ ects in the long term, increasing potential output. Suﬃ  cient levels 
of aggregate demand lead to increasing economies of scale, as well as greater 
private investment. This new investment – particularly in capital equipment 
– boosts productivity increases in the long term. 
A renewed fi scal policy must serve to transform economic growth. European 
countries need growth-inducing investment in the social and ecological in-
frastructure that are not possible in the current context, focused exclusively 
on budget consolidation. Such investments are needed to foster productive 
convergence inside the euro zone among the diﬀ erent regions, but also to con-
front the challenges of digitalisation, energy transition and climate change 
or gender equality, to name some of the main examples. Increasing spend-
ing on active labour market policy may be a minimum consensus, as training 
tends not to be contested by any economist or serious politician, is relatively 
cheap and obviously needed, but hard to increase suﬃ  ciently in times of tight 
budgets and high unemployment. The announced Green Deal, including a 
Just Transition Fund (von der Leyen 2019), might go in the right direction, 
although it seems that it will fall short as regards spending power.
The EMU needs more fi nancial resources at the central level in order to drive 
upward convergence between regions. Several questions need addressing, 
however. First, should this be a euro-zone or an EU budget? Second, given the 
obvious lack of consensus among member states, which areas should receive 
money as a priority? Thirdly, how much money is required? Fourthly, how 
can we fi nance this budget? A bolder EU budget fi nanced by (fractions of) new 
harmonized taxes (especially on high income to counter inequality) spent on 
common goods (Trans-European Networks, research projects, Europe 2030 
or other targets) might be a solution, which has to be developed further. The 
new Budgetary Instrument for Convergence and Competitiveness (Eurogroup 
2019), with an envisaged cumulated amount of around 0.015 per cent of GDP 
each year, is obviously not.
A fi rst step to move forward in the development of a fi scal capacity for the euro 
area – instead of arguing about the size that this budget must have – can be to 
discuss the type of public goods that we should fi nance for all Europeans. We 
must take advantage of the fi scal debate to promote what is perhaps the public 
investment that Europe needs most at this moment in order to transform eco-
nomic growth: a Green New Deal. By developing an egalitarian clean energy 
investment programme for the EU, with an investment of 1.5 to 2.0 per cent 
of the EU’s GDP each year over a full 10-year investment cycle, we will be able 
us to tackle several goals simultaneously. These goals include a rapid raise 
in energy eﬃ  ciency standards, an expansion of the EU’s supply of renewable 
sources, a reduction in carbon emissions and an increase in new green jobs.
Towards a progressive EMU ﬁ scal governance 
 WP 2019.13 19
4.2 Principle 2: : ‘safer’ government bonds
The member states of the euro area should be able again to issue safe sover-
eign bonds, at an interest rate below the rate of growth to reduce the weight 
of the public debt controlled by the ECB, and to tackle the ‘inherent instability 
of the sovereign bond markets’ (De Grauwe and Ji 2018). They should be able 
to run public defi cits in line with their macroeconomic stabilisation needs, 
taking into account their growth model. Public debt mutually guaranteed by 
the ECB or by Eurobonds should therefore be restricted to countries agreeing 
to submit their economic policies to a coordination process (see Principle 3). 
Economic governance reforms implemented since 2010 should be reviewed 
and their aims should be modifi ed in this respect. It must be guaranteed that 
this process does not ending up with ‘coordination’ dominated again by an 
arbitrary fi scal rule (like the 60 per cent of GDP debt ceiling, as proposed for 
example by Bini Smaghi and Marcussen 2018). The process should always 
reach an agreement on coordinated but diﬀ erentiated strategies. 
Public defi cits resulting from this coordination process should be fi nanced 
through debt issuance guaranteed by all euro area countries and by the ECB. 
Only where a country pursues a too expansionary fi scal policy, for which there 
is evidence of adverse eﬀ ects on its partners, may its new securities not be col-
lectively guaranteed. If the debt increase comes from new economic shocks, 
however, securities issued by the country must be guaranteed. The Treaty 
needs to maintain an eﬀ ective process in the event there is no agreement. In 
that case, the new debt issued by countries outside the agreement would not 
be guaranteed, but such a case should never occur in practice. 
The fact that public debts are currently not guaranteed is a factor of fragility 
for the banking sector, which cannot be solved by compelling banks to con-
sider their national public debt assets as risky. Large deposit banks should be 
entirely warranted by the Single Resolution Fund, smaller ones by their state; 
in return, their activities should be controlled and limited to prevent fi nancial 
bubbles and they should focus on productive activities (especially re-industri-
alisation and environmental transition). They should be forbidden to engage 
in speculative activation and to fi nance speculators, such as hedge funds.
We are aware that it would be diﬃ  cult, if not impossible, to reach such an 
agreement, based on intelligent and precise cooperation rather than an unco-
ordinated decentralised process with rigid limits provided by numerical rules. 
It would require negotiations with uncertain outcomes, more confi dence be-
tween member states and changing the European Treaty. Nevertheless, this is 
the best way for a currency area to work properly. 
In the meantime, pragmatic steps to guarantee a minimum safety net should 
be implemented and prolonged. The ECB’s OMT programme and the ESM 
allowed for some ex ante stabilisation. The conditionality of harsh austerity 
programmes, which dampen aggregate demand and add to macroeconomic 
fragility, however, means that the measures are double-edged. Furthermore, 
unconventional monetary policy helped a lot, so the eﬀ ective stabilisation 
Álvarez et al. 
20 WP 2019.13
power of OMT and ESM will become clear only in the next economic down-
turn. A backstop is needed for the single resolution fund in order to avoid the 
transformation of a national banking crisis into sovereign funding problems. 
The ECB itself must be reformed in order to expand its objectives and 
strengthen its democratic control. The new objectives of the ECB must include 
employment and fi nancial stability, alongside price stability and on an equal 
footing. This must also involve formal coordination of monetary policy with 
the rest of economic policy. The role of lender of last resort should ultimately 
be guaranteed not only for banks, but also for national treasuries. In fact, the 
ECB has implicitly played this role throughout the crisis, mainly through the 
OMT programme. This has been presented as an exceptional and discretion-
ary action by the ECB, however, justifi ed by an infl ation rate that is too low. It 
cannot be taken for granted that this unconventional monetary policy will be 
repeated on other occasions and therefore it must be formalised on the basis 
of formal statutes. 
4.3 Principle 2: more and better coordination 
between ﬁ scal and other economic, social and 
environmental policies, as well as between 
member states to foster sustainable well-being 
Good fi scal policy should be part of a broader multi-level governance frame-
work aiming for example at the ‘well-being of its peoples’ or sustainable ‘eco-
nomic and social progress’. Both principles are also expressed in the European 
Treaties (see Feigl 2017), in the overall global UN priorities provided by the 
Agenda for Sustainable Development (UN 2015) and by Stiglitz et al. (2018) 
in their new report on measuring what really counts as regards economic and 
social performance. With the recent adoption of Council Conclusions on ‘the 
Economy of Wellbeing’ (Council of the European Union 2019) and Ursula von 
der Leyen’s announcement that she will ‘refocus the European Semester into 
an instrument that integrates the United Nations Sustainable Development 
Goals’ (von der Leyen 2019: 9), the issue has already gained momentum in the 
European institutions. 
To achieve sustainable and upward-convergent well-being, EMU needs 
policy coordination well beyond numerical fi scal targets. This needs to be 
organised between the member states. Coordination should target material 
well-being, full employment, quality of life, ecological and economic sustain-
ability. Countries should follow an economic policy strategy that allows them 
to meet commonly agreed economic, social and environmental targets (see 
Mersch 2018). 
In the euro zone’s current economic policy framework, wages are seen mainly 
as a mechanism for adjusting competitiveness as national governments com-
pete with each other to promote their exports. One consequence of this has 
been downward wage competition, weakening of aggregate domestic demand 
in the euro zone and rising inequality (see, for example, Timbeau et al. 2017). 
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It is important to abandon this approach and to recognise the need to coordi-
nate wage policies in order to guarantee wage growth in all countries, making 
it possible to close the gap that has been growing for years between wages 
and productivity (see, for example, Theodoropoulou 2019). A common ref-
erence for wage growth – a ‘golden rule’ – should be developed and coordi-
nated among social partners and countries to prevent the race to bottom: in 
the medium term, nominal wages should grow in line with average labour 
productivity growth and the infl ation target. Coordination should be extended 
beyond a golden rule. Adjustment processes should be implemented by coun-
tries in which wages have risen too rapidly or insuﬃ  ciently in recent years. 
This adjustment process could be facilitated by social contribution increases 
to fi nance more generous social benefi ts in surplus countries, or by social con-
tribution cuts (oﬀ set by higher taxation on capital gains or on wealth) in defi -
cit member states. 
Countries should aim for price stability with an infl ation rate at around 2 
per cent (and more for catching-up countries or for countries with high cur-
rent account surpluses). Member states should also announce and negotiate 
their current account balance targets. It is necessary to put in place a bilat-
eral mechanism that ensures control of the current account imbalances of the 
euro-zone countries. In this way, application to the euro zone of the principles 
of the so-called ‘Keynes Plan’ for reforming the international monetary system 
(originally mooted at Bretton Woods) would lay the foundations for more sta-
ble and balanced growth. Countries running high external surpluses should 
agree to (i) lower them or (ii) to fi nance explicitly new industrial projects in 
economies in danger of having external defi cits or the European Investment 
Bank (EIB). This partial channelling of the surplus balances would favour new 
EU industrial policies and the social-ecological transformation. 
Furthermore, no fi scal strategy should ignore the causes of the Great Reces-
sion, such as the long-term pressure on wages. To sustain demand growth, 
countries such as Germany have followed a neo-mercantilist export-led strat-
egy, while Anglo-Saxon and Southern Europe countries have been credit-led, 
fuelling fi nancial and real estate bubbles. The unwinding of these strategies 
forced several governments to expand public defi cits to restore growth. To 
bring them down in a sustainable and socially accepted way requires a coor-
dinated strategy based on a new growth model and higher public revenues via 
tax harmonisation and a fi ght against tax evasion by the richest people and 
multinational companies. 
A new growth model should be based on a more equal income distribution 
and on a new industrial policy, with large investment programmes geared to-
wards an environmentally sustainable economy. This requires a political turn-
ing point: Europe should have clear objectives of full employment, ecological 
transition and social model development. Similar to what is envisaged in the 
European Pillar of Social Rights, Europe should move forward on:
(i)  upward convergence in minimum wages (60 per cent of the median 
wage); 
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(ii) social protection (with ambitious targets for the population and child 
poverty rates and minimum requirements for national unemploy-
ment insurance systems); 
(iii)  labour regulations (with more rights for employees to intervene in 
corporate governance); fi nally, 
(iv)  all trade treaties should include social and ecological commitments.
On the revenue side, Europe needs a strategy of tax harmonisation, to set 
minimum tax rates for fi rms and higher incomes, to tax higher wealth and to 
ensure that each country is able to tax its fi rms and its residents. Tax evasion, 
tax optimisation and tax competition must be confronted by policymakers. 
All mechanisms allowing tax optimisation or evasion should be eliminated. 
An extensive list should be drawn up of all tax or regulatory havens, including 
those located in Europe. EU countries should prohibit their banks, fi nancial 
institutions and companies from locating their operations in these havens. 
Furthermore, carbon taxation should be reinforced. In particular, the coordi-
nation of corporation tax is key to avoiding tax dumping. Corporate taxation 
regimes diﬀ er considerably between countries and in many of them tax loop-
holes are used by companies to avoid part of the taxation, shifting their tax 
burden from one country to another. It is crucial to set a minimum European 
eﬀ ective tax rate of – for example, 25 per cent – below which the various na-
tional systems cannot introduce further exemptions and lower taxation.
The euro zone’s proper functioning depends on the European project becom-
ing popular again, fostering social and economic progress, an objective of con-
vergence and solidarity among member states, and a turn towards a devel-
opment model taking ecological constraints fully into account. Institutional 
progress should concentrate on this framework. 
A less ambitious proposal is to develop an integrated scoreboard of econom-
ic, social and environmental indicators, to monitor developments and draw 
attention to deviations, which should be addressed by coordinated policies. 
They should be analysed in an ‘Annual Well-being and Convergence Survey 
(AWCS)’ (Feigl 2017: 4) and broadly discussed at the beginning of the Europe-
an Semester before drafting the priorities, at least within the European Parlia-
ment, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Macroeconomic 
Dialogue. European governance should incorporate the global Sustainable 
Development Goals (see also Mersch 2018). The AWCS could be written by 
a council of economic, social and environmental experts, for example nom-
inated by the European Parliament, together with the European Economic 
and Social Committee. The European Commission should only draft recom-
mendations for the Parliament and Council to adopt after various discussions 
with the relevant stakeholders. This new council of experts should identify 
developments in well-being, convergence and sustainability and qualitatively 
assess targets, indicators and the current situation. Because this new coun-
cil would seek to strengthen coherence and incorporate the objectives of the 
existing fi scal council (such as fi scal coordination, a proper fi scal stance and 
fi scal stability), the latter should be replaced by the former.   
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4.4 Principle 4: more democratic participation and 
scrutiny 
One requirement for more democratic European fi scal governance is a 
clause on ‘democratic conditionality’, according to which any change in the 
governance of the euro zone, or the creation of any new institution, must 
ensure parliamentary control in its election and accountability. A second re-
quirement is for some kind of EMU parliament (for example, as a subgroup of 
the European Parliament) with the right of co-deciding on all aspects of euro-
zone economic decision-making. Third, the positions of each minister within 
the Eurogroup should be made public, allowing for a qualifi ed discussion at 
the national level. Fourth, social partners as representatives of organized eco-
nomic agents have to be seriously involved at the European, as well as the 
national level and not only formally by establishing ex-post meetings with an 
opportunity to comment on decisions already made. Fifth, the predominant 
status of fi scal rules (and furthermore competitiveness and economic growth) 
should be downgraded to being only one element of an economic governance 
focused on sustainable and upward-convergent well-being, as the Union’s 
overall aim (see Principle 3). 
In the short run, the third proposal on increasing transparency is the easiest. 
Whether it will make a signifi cant diﬀ erence remains to be seen. Giving the 
predominance of conservative ministers within the Eurogroup, it could even 
have a contradictory eﬀ ect, as the pressure not to accept compromises could 
increase, especially in northern countries. On the other hand, more transpar-
ency could lead to a more informed debate and force the Eurogroup to develop 
a better economic underpinning for their decisions. Making the EWG more 
transparent increases the possibility for parliamentary control of national po-
sitions in each member state and gives political players the possibility to raise 
public awareness of upcoming issues.
Advancing the development of a fi scal union with fewer rules and more coor-
dination requirements (see Principle 1) will lead to the creation of new institu-
tions and supranational responsibilities. These steps should not be taken until 
it is guaranteed that these new institutions are subject to parliamentary con-
trol, however. This ‘democratic conditionality’ clause must ensure that new 
institutions are not built up away from the democratic control of ordinary Eu-
ropeans. In fact, some of the existing institutions must democratise urgently. 
That is the case with regard to the ECB. The ECB was conceived as an inde-
pendent agency that could guarantee, using strictly ‘technical’ criteria, price 
stability throughout the monetary union. Today, however, it is evident that it 
has become an important political actor, with the capacity in many cases to 
infl uence the economic policies of national governments, with the added re-
sponsibility of banking supervision, and with a decisive infl uence on the euro 
zone’s economic and fi nancial stability. The ECB implements tasks that go far 
beyond its mandate to monitor infl ation and therefore must be placed under 
greater democratic control. The procedure for appointing the President, Vice-
President and the rest of the members of the Executive Board of the ECB, now 
characterised by secrecy and its intergovernmental nature, should be modi-
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fi ed. Not only must the selection criteria be made transparent, but it must be 
carried out by a euro-zone Parliament together with a public discussion on the 
policy orientation of the institution. 
The biggest advantage of a parliamentary formation for euro zone co-decision-
making, not only on fi scal policy but on all aspects of economic policy, is the 
potential to shift the logic from the sum of national policies and diﬀ erent na-
tional interests to appropriate policies for EMU as a whole. Additionally, such 
a formation seems to be the only player able to enforce decisions in the Eu-
ropean interest when there are no Pareto-solutions between member states. 
For example, in the case of the Greek memorandum of 2015, although it is 
likely that we would have seen austerity measures, they would have been more 
reasonable, less harmful, taken with more legitimacy and therefore more eﬃ  -
cient with less confl ict. Of course such a formation is no silver bullet, as power 
relations would be not entirely diﬀ erent from those in the Eurogroup. How-
ever, with the European elections 2019, the European level already seems to 
be more favourable for well-being oriented fi scal policy decisions than it was 
in the past, measured by declarations to ‘make full use of the fl exibility … [to] 
achieve a more growth-friendly fi scal stance in the euro area’ (von der Leyen 
2019: 9), as well as to ‘refocus the European Semester into an instrument that 
integrates the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals’ (ibid.), ‘fair 
taxation’ (ibid.), a ‘European Green Deal’ (ibid.) or the conclusions on the 
‘Economy of Wellbeing’ (Council of the European Union 2019). 
Furthermore, the prospect of alternative outcomes in future elections always 
favours political concessions in the here and now (although European election 
campaigns hitherto have generally not focussed on common European prob-
lems and political solutions). A parliamentary body for the euro zone could 
also alleviate the legitimacy problem of decisions taken within the framework 
of the European Semester. At present they are taken upon the economic ex-
pertise of the Commission with more (such as the European Fiscal Board) 
or less formally involved experts, mostly grounded in ideas that have been 
controversial within the economics profession, with asymmetric eﬀ ects on dif-
ferent social groups. Finally, although importantly, a parliamentary body is a 
precondition for a signifi cant euro-zone budget and increased accountability 
of executive bodies, such as the Commission and the Board of the European 
Central Bank. 
Another important issue is broader economic policy coordination, of which 
fi scal policy is an important part. To achieve sustainable prosperity and up-
ward-convergence, there should be true economic policy coordination by 
more decisive economic actors, such as the social partners, and not only mem-
ber state fi nance ministers. By involving the most important social groups, 
political acceptance would increase, which is vital for more stable solutions.
Most of our proposals may not be feasible in the short term, but options are 
already available to improve matters. For example, the European Parliament 
could increase pressure in relation to economic issues decided by other in-
stitutions. The inclusion of social partners in the political process could be 
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increased immediately. Furthermore, the Eurogroup and the EWG could pub-
lish more data. In the past three years, we already have seen some progress in 
all three respects and it is likely that this has contributed to the development 
of a more reasonable fi scal policy compared with the previous strict focus on 
austerity.
Last but not least, nothing prevents the European Commission from publish-
ing an integrated annual report on well-being, sustainable development and 
upward convergence, instead of the excessively narrow growth report, as the 
starting point for policy coordination within the European Semester (Mersch 
2018). This new focus would be more in line with the fundamental economic 
policy principles stated in Article 3 of the TEU (well-being of its peoples, based 
on sustainable development, balanced economic growth, price stability, full 
employment and social progress, quality of the environment, cohesion and so 
on) and nurture public debate.
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5. Summary and conclusions 
While Economic and Monetary Union has undergone major changes in the 
past decade, several problems remain and should be addressed by a new fi scal 
governance reform. Although we have seen progress in crisis mitigation, if a 
new crisis occurred, problems such as the narrow fi scal space at national level 
due to misguided, in part pro-cyclical and asymmetrically focused fi scal rules, 
the absence of an explicit lender of last resort and pressure from fi nancial 
market players would again become urgent. Furthermore, there are structural 
defi ciencies, such as the end of convergence for all member states, low levels 
of public investment in the face of increasing social-ecological challenges, the 
focus of the European Semester on fi scal rules and competitiveness instead 
of on well-being and sustainable development, tax competition and a lack of 
democratic participation and control in the European Economic Governance. 
To address these problems, we have formulated four principles for further 
reforms: (i) a much more active and prominent role for fi scal policy, (ii) ‘safer’ 
government bonds, (iii) more and better coordination between fi scal and oth-
er economic, social and environmental policies, as well as between member 
states to foster sustainable well-being and (iv) more democratic participation 
and scrutiny. Every further step to change fi scal governance should deliver 
progress on these principles. Concrete measures should be evaluated on this 
basis.
As there is no consensus on what else should be done, measures will be a com-
promise between diﬀ erent approaches and governments. Although we advo-
cate ambitious measures, we also propose other less far-reaching ones that 
would be easier to implement and thus more diﬃ  cult to reject. For example, 
concerning the fi rst principle, we think that fi scal rules should be replaced by 
economic coordination that takes into consideration macroeconomic, social 
and environmental aspects. But we also propose economically more reason-
able, but also more limited reforms in order to allow for more national fi scal 
space. 
At the European level, fi scal capacities should be strengthened to deliver 
public value directly and to provide for cross-border stabilisation. Tools to 
keep fi nancing costs low should accompany all proposals. Better coordina-
tion should mean having a more balanced overall economic policy to foster 
the well-being of the EU’s peoples and expand fi scal space in the longer term 
by safeguarding tax revenues from transnational companies and the mobile 
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wealthy. Co-decision-making by the European (or EMU) Parliament should 
also be expanded with regard to fi scal policy, so that citizens could vote for 
certain policies and reject others. 
Every step taken to strengthen our four principles would be welcome. 
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